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► To cite this version:

Achour Mostefaoui, Matoula Petrolia, Michel Raynal, Claude Jard. Atomic Read/Write Memory in Signature-free Byzantine Asynchronous Message-passing Systems. 2015. hal-01238765

HAL Id: hal-01238765

<https://inria.hal.science/hal-01238765>

Preprint submitted on 8 Dec 2015

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Atomic Read/Write Memory in Signature-free Byzantine Asynchronous Message-passing Systems

Achour Mostéfaoui* Matoula Petrolia** Michel Raynal*** Claude Jard****

Abstract: This article presents a signature-free distributed algorithm which builds an atomic read/write shared memory on top of an n -process asynchronous message-passing system in which up to $t < n/3$ processes may commit Byzantine failures. From a conceptual point of view, this algorithm is designed to be as close as possible to the algorithm proposed by Attiya, Bar-Noy and Dolev (JACM 1995), which builds an atomic register in an n -process asynchronous message-passing system where up to $t < n/2$ processes may crash. The proposed algorithm is particularly simple. It does not use cryptography to cope with Byzantine processes, and is optimal from a t -resilience point of view ($t < n/3$). A read operation requires $O(n)$ messages, and a write operation requires $O(n^2)$ messages.

Key-words: Asynchronous message-passing system, Atomic read/write register, Byzantine process, Linearizability, Reliable broadcast abstraction.

Mémoire partagée fiable dans les systèmes asynchrones avec processus Byzantins

Résumé : Cet article présente une construction de mémoire partagée au dessus d'un système asynchrone à passage de messages dans lequel jusqu'à $t < n/3$ processus peuvent avoir des comportements arbitraires (fautes Byzantines), n étant le nombre total de processus.

Mots clés : systèmes asynchrones à passage de messages, registres atomiques read/write, diffusion fiable, processus Byzantins.

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1 Introduction

Shared memory abstraction on top of a message-passing system *Informatics* is a science of abstractions, and accordingly (as in sequential computing) the writing of distributed applications can be greatly facilitated by the design and the use of underlying appropriate abstractions.

This paper considers the design of such an abstraction, namely an atomic read/write memory, on top of an asynchronous message-passing distributed system made up of n processes, and where up to t processes may commit failures. The case of crash failures was solved by Attiya, Bar-Noy and Dolev in [3] (a) where it is shown that $t < n/2$ is an upper bound for the model parameter t , and (b) where a simple, elegant, and t -resilient optimal algorithm is proposed. This algorithm is called ABD in the following.

This paper focuses on the case where processes may commit Byzantine failures, i.e., may behave in a way that does not respect their intended behavior (as defined by their specification).

Related work Considering the *clients/servers* distributed model, several articles have addressed the design of servers implementing a shared memory accessible by clients. The servers are usually managing a set of disks (e.g., [8, 13, 18]). Moreover, while they consider that some servers can be Byzantine, some articles restrict the failure type allowed to clients. As an example, [9, 10] explore the efficiency issues (relation between resilience and fast reads) in the context where only servers can be Byzantine, while clients (the single writer and the readers) can fail by crashing. As other examples, [13] considers that clients can only commit crash failures, while [4] considers that clients can only be “semi-Byzantine” (i.e., they can issue a bounded number of faulty writes, but otherwise respect their code). The algorithm presented in [17] allows clients and some number of servers to be Byzantine, but requires clients to sign their messages. As far as we know, [1] was the first paper considering Byzantine readers while still offering maximal resilience (with respect to the number of Byzantine servers) without using cryptography. However, the writer can fail only by crashing, and the fact that a –possibly Byzantine– reader does not write a fake value in a register (to ensure the “reader have to write” rule required to implement atomicity) is insured only with some probability.

In the *peer-to-peer* model (defined here as a model in which all processes are “equal”), the construction of an atomic register requires that each process manages a copy the register that is built. The first algorithm building a read/write shared memory in a message-passing system where processes may commit Byzantine failures is (to our knowledge) the one presented in [12]. This paper considers the implementation of an SWMR (single-writer/multi-reader) atomic register. It also shows that $t < n/3$ is an upper bound the resilience parameter t for such a construction. In this algorithm, each SWMR atomic read/write register is represented, at each process, by the full history of all its modifications.

The fact that an SWMR register is considered is due to the following observation: as a Byzantine process can corrupt any register it can write, the design of a multi-writer/multi-reader register with non-trivial correctness guarantees is impossible in the presence of Byzantine processes.

Content of the paper This paper presents a new algorithm implementing an array of n SWMR atomic read/write registers (one per process) in an asynchronous message-passing system where up to $t < n/3$ processes may commit Byzantine failures. This algorithm does not require to enrich the underlying system with cryptography-based techniques.

When designing this algorithm, an aim was to obtain an algorithm whose “spirit” is “as close as possible” to ABD. We think that this is important from both understanding and pedagogical point of views. It helps better understand the “gap” between crash failures and Byzantine failures. From an algorithmic point of view, we have the following:

- With respect to the algorithm described in [12], the proposed algorithm requires a process to store only a single pair (value, sequence number) per atomic register.
- With respect to ABD, there are two main differences:
 - One is the way processes implement the “reads have to write” requirement needed to obtain the atomicity property of a register [16].
 - The other one lies in the broadcast operation used to disseminate new values. While a simple unreliable broadcast¹ is sufficient in the presence of process crash failures, a stronger broadcast needs to be used to cope with Byzantine processes in a signature-free system.

The resulting algorithm is particularly simple. Moreover, when considering the non-faulty processes, a read costs $O(n)$ messages and a write costs $O(n^2)$ messages.

¹This broadcast is a simple send of the same message to all processes. If a process crashes during its execution, it is possible that only a subset of the processes receive the message.

Roadmap The paper is composed of 6 sections. Section 2 presents the computation model, and the underlying reliable broadcast abstraction. Section 3 presents a specification of an SWMR read/write atomic register in the presence of Byzantine processes. Then, Section 4 presents the algorithm, and Section 5 proves its correctness. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Computation model

2.1 Process model, communication model, and failure model

Computing entities The system is made up of a set Π of n sequential processes, denoted p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n . These processes are asynchronous in the sense that each process progresses at its own speed, which can be arbitrary and remains always unknown to the other processes.

Communication model The processes cooperate by sending and receiving messages through bi-directional channels. The communication network is a complete network, which means that each process p_i can directly send a message to any process p_j (including itself). It is assumed that the Byzantine processes cannot control the network, hence when a process receives a message, it can unambiguously identify its sender. Each channel is reliable (no loss, corruption, or creation of messages), not necessarily first-in/first-out, and asynchronous (while the transit time of each message is finite, there is no upper bound on message transit times).

A process p_i invokes the operation “send TAG(m) to p_j ” to send the message tagged TAG and carrying the value m . It receives a message tagged TAG by invoking the operation “receive TAG()”. “broadcast TAG(m)” is a macro-operation that expands as “**for each** $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ send TAG(m) to p_j **end for**”. (The sending order is arbitrary, which means that, if the sender crashes while executing this statement, an arbitrary subset of processes of processes will receive the message.)

Byzantine failures The model parameter t is an upper bound on the number of processes that can exhibit a Byzantine behavior [14, 21]. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Hence, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to send a message m to all the processes, can send a message m_1 to some processes, a different message m_2 to another subset of processes, and no message at all to the other processes. Moreover, while they cannot modify the content of the messages sent by non-Byzantine processes, they can read their content and reorder their deliveries. More generally, Byzantine processes can collude to “pollute” the computation.

A Byzantine process is also called a *faulty* process. A process that commits no failure (i.e., a non-Byzantine process) is also called a *correct* process.

Notation In the following, the previous computation model, restricted to the case where $t < n/3$, is denoted $\mathcal{BAMP}_{n,t}[t < n/3]$.

2.2 Reliable broadcast abstraction

This section presents a reliable broadcast abstraction (denoted r-broadcast) that will be used to build a read/write register (Section 4). This abstraction is a simple generalization of a reliable broadcast due to Bracha [6]. While Bracha’s abstraction is for a single broadcast, the proposed abstraction considers that each process can issue a sequence of broadcasts. It is shown in [6] that $t < n/3$ is a necessary requirement to cope with the net effect of asynchrony and Byzantine failures.

Specification The reliable broadcast abstraction is defined by two operations denoted R_broadcast() and R_deliver(). When a process p_i invokes R_broadcast() we say that “ p_i r-broadcasts a value”. Similarly, when p_i returns from an invocation of R_deliver() and obtains a value, we say “ p_i r-delivers a value”.

The operation R_broadcast() has two input parameters: a broadcast value v , and an integer sn , which is a local sequence number used to identify the successive r-broadcasts issued by each process p_i . The sequence of numbers used by each (correct) process is the increasing sequence of consecutive integers.

- **RB-Validity.** If a correct process r-delivers a pair (v, sn) from a correct process p_i , then p_i invoked the operation R_broadcast(v, sn).
- **RB-Integrity.** Given any process p_i , a correct process r-delivers at most once a pair $(-, sn)$ from p_i .
- **RB-Uniformity.** If a correct process r-delivers a pair (v, sn) from p_i (possibly faulty), then all the correct processes eventually r-deliver the same pair (v, sn) from p_i .

- **RB-Termination.** If the process that invokes $R_broadcast(v, sn)$ is correct, all the correct processes eventually r-deliver the pair (v, sn) .

RB-Validity is on correct processes and relates their outputs to their inputs, namely no correct process r-delivers spurious messages from correct processes. RB-Integrity states that there is no r-broadcast duplication. RB-Uniformity is an “all or none” property (it is not possible for a pair to be delivered by a correct process and to be never delivered by the other correct processes). RB-Termination is a liveness property: at least all the pairs r-broadcast by correct processes are r-delivered by them.

For completeness, an algorithm (due to Bracha [6]), which implements the r-broadcast abstraction in the model $\mathcal{BAMP}_{n,t}[t < n/3]$, is described in Appendix A.

3 Atomic Read/Write Registers in the Presence of Byzantine Processes

3.1 Definitions and specification

Single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) registers The fault-tolerant shared memory supplied to the upper abstraction layer is an array denoted $REG[1..n]$. For each i , $REG[i]$ is a single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) register. This means that $REG[i]$ can be written only by p_i . To that end, p_i invokes the operation $REG[i].write(v)$ where v is the value it wants to write into $REG[i]$. Differently, any process p_j can read $REG[i]$. It invokes then the operation $REG[i].read()$.

As already noticed in the Introduction, the “single-writer” requirement is natural in the presence of Byzantine processes. If registers could be written by any process, it would be possible for the Byzantine processes to pollute the whole memory, and no non-trivial computation could be possible.

On write operations by Byzantine processes A Byzantine process p_k may invoke the write operation $REG[k].write()$ to assign a new value to $REG[k]$, but it may also try to modify $REG[k]$ without using this operation. In such a case, its fraudulent attempt to modify $REG[k]$ may succeed or not. If it succeeds, the corresponding modification of $REG[k]$ is considered (from an external observer’s point of view) as if it has been produced by an invocation of $REG[k].write()$ ². This is because no correct process can distinguish such a modification of $REG[k]$ from a call to the write operation by p_k . Let us nevertheless notice that this does not prevent the fact that the value assigned to $REG[k]$ can be a fake value. Moreover, at the abstraction level defined by $REG[1..n]$, as p_k is sequential, its modifications of $REG[k]$ appear as if they have been executed sequentially.

Definitions

- A sequence of values, denoted H_i , is associated with each register $REG[i]$. H_i is the sequence of values written in $REG[i]$. Let $H_i[x]$ denote the x^{th} element of H_i .
- The following notations are used.
 - Let p_i be a correct process. $read[i, j, x]$: execution of $REG[j].read()$ returning $H_i[x]$.
 - $write[i, x]$: x^{th} update of $REG[i]$ by p_i . Hence, $write[i, x]$ defines the value of $H_i[x]$.
If p_i is a correct process, $write[i, x]$ corresponds to an execution of $REG[i].write()$. If p_i is Byzantine, according to the previous discussion, these “ $write[i, x]$ ” capture all the modifications of $REG[i]$ by p_i , be them associated with a call to the write operation or not. (Let us remember that, at this abstraction level, any process is sequential.)

Specification

The correct behavior of the array of registers $REG[1..n]$ is defined by the following set of properties.

- **Termination (liveness).** Let p_i be a correct process.
 - Each invocation of $REG[i].write()$ terminates.
 - For any j , any invocation of $REG[j].read()$ by p_i terminates.
- **Consistency (safety)**³. Let p_i and p_j be correct processes and p_k any process.
 - Read followed by write: ($read[i, k, x]$ terminates before $write[k, y]$ starts) $\Rightarrow (x < y)$.

²As we will see, at the operational level, when a modification of $REG[i]$ by a Byzantine process p_i succeeds, the underlying messages generated by p_i could have been sent by a correct implementation of the operation $write()$.

³It would be possible to associate a start event and an end event with each $read[i, j, x]$ and each $write[i, y]$ issued by a correct process, and a start event with each $write[j, y]$ issued by a Byzantine process, so that all these events define a total order from which the notion of “terminates before” could be formally defined (as in [11, 15, 23]). To not overload the presentation, we do not use this formalization here.

- Write followed by read: ($write[j, x]$ terminates before $read[i, j, y]$ starts) $\Rightarrow (x \leq y)$.⁴
- No read inversion: ($read[i, k, x]$ terminates before $read[j, k, y]$ starts) $\Rightarrow (x \leq y)$.

As there is no way to constrain the behavior of a Byzantine process, the termination property is only on correct processes, and there is no requirement on the value returned by a read issued by a Byzantine process. The safety property concerns only the values read by correct processes. The first property states that there is no read from the future, while the second property states that no read can obtain an overwritten value. Due to the possible concurrent accesses to a same register, these two properties actually defines a regular register [15]. Hence the “no read inversion” property, which allows to obtain an atomic register from a regular register [7, 15, 23].

3.2 Linearizability

Atomic registers were formally defined in [15, 19]. Then, the atomicity concept was extended to any concurrent object defined by a sequential specification under the name linearizability [11]. Hence in our context, the terms “atomic register” and “linearizable register” are synonymous. The properties provided by linearizability are investigated in [11].

Definition Given a register $REG[i]$, *linearizability* [11] means that it is possible to totally order the executions of its read and write operations in such a way that (a) each operation appears as if it has been executed at a single point of the time line between its start event and its end event, (b) no two operation executions appear at the same point, and (c) each read operation returns the value written by the closest write operation that precedes it in the sequence (or the initial value if there is no such write operation).

A register is *linearizable* if its operations satisfy the previous items (a), (b), and (c). The *linearization point* of an operation is the point of the timeline at which this operation appears to have been instantaneously executed.

An important property of Linearizability An important theorem associated with linearizability is the following [11]: If each object (here a register) is linearizable, then the set of all the objects, considered as a single object, is linearizable. This means that linearizable objects compose for free.

Theorem 1 *The register specification defined in Section 3 defines atomic (linearizable) registers.*

Proof As linearizable (atomic) objects compose for free [11], it is sufficient to consider a single register and, starting from its specification defined in Section 3.1, show that it is linearizable.

Let $REG[i]$ be a register. Let H_i be the sequence of values written by p_i in $REG[i]$.⁵ The proof consists in building a sequence S_i which (a) includes all the read operations of $REG[i]$ issued by the correct processes plus the writes of $REG[i]$ issued by p_i , and (b) satisfies the definition of linearizability.

To simplify and without loss of generality, let us assume that there is an initial write that gives $REG[i]$ its initial value. Let us start with S_i being the sequence of write operations that produced the sequence H_i .

Let $read[j, i, x]$ be a read operation issued by a correct process p_j . Let $write[i, a]$ be the last write of $REG[i]$ that terminates before $read[j, i, x]$ starts. Let $write[i, a+1], \dots, write[i, a+c]$ be (if any) the writes of $REG[i]$ that are concurrent with $read[j, i, x]$. If there is no such writes $c = 0$. Let $b = a + 1$. Hence, if any, $write[i, b]$ is the first write of $REG[i]$ starting after $read[j, i, x]$ has terminated. We have the following.

- It follows that from the properties “read followed by write” and “write followed by read” that $x \in \{a, a+1, \dots, a+c\}$.
- It follows from the “no read inversion” property that if $read[\ell, i, x']$ (issued a correct process p_ℓ) starts after $read[j, i, x]$, we have $x \leq x'$.

The operation $read[j, i, x]$ is added to S_i just after $write[i, x]$. If there are two (or more) operations $read[j_1, i, x]$ and $read[j_2, i, x]$ issued by correct processes, they are placed one after the other in the sequence S_i . All the read operations issued by the correct processes are added to S_i as described.

It is easy to see that the execution associated with S_i is linearizable (i.e., satisfies the items (a), (b), and (c) stated above).

□ *Theorem 1*

⁴Let us notice that this property considers that the write of $REG[j]$ is issued by a correct process. This is because it is not always possible to define when the modification of $REG[j]$ has terminated when p_j is Byzantine.

⁵As we have seen, if p_i is Byzantine, this sequence contains all the modifications of $REG[i]$ which cannot be distinguished by the correct processes from invocations of $REG[i].write()$ by p_i .

4 Construction of Single-Writer/Multi-Reader Atomic Registers

An algorithm constructing an SWMR atomic (linearizable) register in the presence of up to t Byzantine processes, is described in Figure 1. As it assumes $t < n/3$, this algorithm is suited for the computing model $\mathcal{BAMP}_{n,t}[t < n/3]$. The algorithm presents the code associated with a correct process p_i .

The design of the algorithm strives to be as close as possible to the ABD algorithm [3], which implements an atomic register in an asynchronous system where at most $t < n/2$ may crash.⁶ It uses a **wait**(*condition*) statement. The corresponding process is blocked until the predicate *condition* becomes satisfied. While a process is blocked, it can process the messages it receives.

Local variables Each process p_i manages the following local variables whose scope is the full computation (local variables are denoted with lower case letters, and sub-scripted by the process index i).

- $reg_i[1..n]$ is the local representation of the array $REG[1..n]$ of atomic SWMR registers. Each local register $reg_i[j]$ contains two fields, a sequence number $reg_i[j].sn$, and the corresponding value $reg_i[j].val$. It is initialized to the pair $\langle init_j, 0 \rangle$, where $init_j$ is the initial value of $REG[j]$.
- wsn_i is an integer, initialized to 0, used by p_i to associate sequence numbers with its successive write invocations.
- $rsn_i[1..n]$ is an array of sequence numbers (initialized to $[0, \dots, 0]$) such that $sn_i[j]$ is used by p_i to identify its successive read invocations of $REG[j]$.⁷

The operation $REG[i].write(v)$ This operation is implemented by the client lines 1-4 and the server lines 11-12 (which are similar to the algorithm implementing a write operation in a crash-prone system [3]).

Process p_i first increases wsn_i and r-broadcasts the message $WRITE(v, wsn_i)$. Let us remark that this is the only use of the reliable broadcast abstraction by the algorithm. The process p_i then waits for acknowledgments (message $WRITE_DONE(v, wsn_i)$) from $(n - t)$ distinct processes, and finally terminates the write operation. As we will see (Lemma 2), the intersection of any two quorums of $(n - t)$ processes contains at least $(t + 1)$ correct processes. This intersection property will be used to prove the consistency of the register $REG[i]$.

When p_i r-delivers a message $WRITE(v, wsn)$ from a process p_j , it waits until $wsn = reg_i[j] + 1$ (line 12). Hence, whatever the sender p_j , its messages $WRITE()$ are processed in their sending order. When this predicate becomes true, p_i updates accordingly its local with respect to $REG[j]$ (line 13), and sends back to p_j an acknowledgment to inform it that its new write has locally been taken into account (line 14).

Write of $REG[j]$ by a Byzantine process p_j Let us observe that the only way for a process p_i to modify $reg_i[j]$ is to r-deliver a message $WRITE(v, wsn)$ from a (correct or faulty) process p_j . Due to the RB-Uniformity of the r-broadcast abstraction, it follows that, if a correct process p_i r-delivers such a message, all correct processes will r-deliver the same message, be its sender correct or faulty. Consequently each of them will eventually execute the statements of lines 12-14.

Hence, when a faulty process invokes $R_broadcast\ WRITE(v, wsn)$ (be the r-broadcast invocation involved in an invocation of $REG[j].write(v)$ or not), its faulty behavior is restricted to broadcast fake values for v and wsn .

The operation $REG[j].read()$ This operation is implemented by the client lines 5-11 and the server line 15. The corresponding algorithm is the core of the implementation of an SWMR atomic register.

When p_i wants to read $REG[j]$, it first broadcasts a read request (message $READ(j, rsn_i[j])$), and waits for corresponding acknowledgments (message $STATE(rsn_i[j], -)$). Each of these acknowledgment carries the sequence number associated with the current value of $REG[j]$, as known by the sender of the message (line 15). For p_i to progress, the wait predicate (line 7) states that its local representation of $REG[j]$, namely $reg_i[j]$, must be fresh enough (let us remember that the only line where $reg_i[j]$ can be modified is line 13, i.e., when p_i r-delivers a message $WRITE(-, -)$ from p_j). This *freshness* predicate states that p_i 's current value of $reg_i[j]$ is as fresh as the current value of at least $(n - t)$ processes (i.e., at least $(n - 2t)$ correct processes). If the freshness predicate is false, it will become true when p_i will have r-delivered $WRITE(-, -)$ messages, which have been r-delivered by other correct processes, but not yet by it.

When this waiting period terminates, p_i considers the current value $\langle w, wsn \rangle$ of $reg_i[j]$ (line 8). It then broadcasts the message $CATCH_UP(j, wsn)$, and returns the value w as soon as its message $CATCH_UP()$ is acknowledged by $(n - t)$ processes (lines 9-10).

The aim of the $CATCH_UP(j, wsn)$ message is to allow each destination process p_k to have a value in its local representation of $REG[j]$ (namely $reg_k[j].val$) at least as recent as the one whose sequence number is wsn (line 15). The aim of this *value*

⁶In addition to the stronger necessary and sufficient condition $t < n/3$, this presentation style allows people aware of the ABD algorithm to see the additional statements needed to go from crash failures to Byzantine behavior.

⁷If we assume that no correct process p_i reads its own register $REG[i]$, $rsn_i[i]$ can be used to store wsn_i .

```

local variables initialization:
 $reg_i[1..n] \leftarrow [\langle init_0, 0 \rangle, \dots, \langle init_n, 0 \rangle]; wsn_i \leftarrow 0; rsn_i[1..n] \leftarrow [0, \dots, 0].$ 
%-----

operation  $REG[i].write(v)$  is
(1)  $wsn_i \leftarrow wsn_i + 1;$ 
(2)  $R\_broadcast\ WRITE(v, wsn_i);$ 
(3) wait  $WRITE\_DONE(wsn_i)$  received from  $(n - t)$  different processes;
(4) return()
end operation.

operation  $REG[j].read()$  is
(5)  $rsn_i[j] \leftarrow rsn_i[j] + 1;$ 
(6)  $broadcast\ READ(j, rsn_i[j]);$ 
(7) wait  $(reg_i[j].sn \geq \max(wsn_1, \dots, wsn_{n-t})$  where  $wsn_1, \dots, wsn_{n-t}$  are from
    messages  $STATE(rsn_i[j], -)$  received from  $n - t$  different processes);
(8) let  $\langle w, wsn \rangle$  the value of  $reg_i[j]$  which allows the previous wait to terminate;
(9)  $broadcast\ CATCH\_UP(j, wsn);$ 
(10) wait  $(CATCH\_UP\_DONE(j, wsn)$  received from  $(n - t)$  different processes);
(11) return( $w$ )
end operation.
%-----

when a message  $WRITE(v, wsn)$  is R_delivered from  $p_j$  do
(12)  $wait(wsn = reg_i[j].sn + 1);$ 
(13)  $reg_i[j] \leftarrow \langle v, wsn \rangle;$ 
(14)  $send\ WRITE\_DONE(wsn)$  to  $p_j.$ 

when a message  $READ(j, rsn)$  is received from  $p_k$  do
(15)  $send\ STATE(rsn, reg_i[j].sn)$  to  $p_k.$ 

when a message  $CATCH\_UP(j, wsn)$  is received from  $p_k$  do
(16)  $wait\ (reg_i[j].sn \geq wsn);$ 
(17)  $send\ CATCH\_UP\_DONE(j, wsn)$  to  $p_k.$ 

```

Figure 1: Atomic SWMR Registers in $\mathcal{BAMP}_{n,t}[t < n/3]$ (code for process p_i)

resynchronization is to prevent read inversions. When p_i has received the $(n - t)$ acknowledgments it was waiting for (line 10), it knows that no other correct process can obtain a value older than the value w it returns.

Message cost of the algorithm In addition to a reliable broadcast (whose message cost is $O(n^2)$), a write operation generates n messages $WRITE_DONE$. Hence the cost of a write is $O(n^2)$ message. A read operation cost $4n$ messages, n messages for each of the four kinds of messages $READ$, $STATE$, $CATCH_UP$ and *catch_up_done*.

Comparing with the crash failure model It is known that the algorithms implementing an atomic register on top of an asynchronous message-passing system prone to process crashes, require that “reads have to write” [2, 3, 5, 16, 22]. More precisely, before returning a value, in one way or another, a reader must write this value to ensure atomicity (otherwise, we have only a “regular” register [15]). Doing so, it is not possible that two sequential read invocations, concurrent with one or more write invocations, be such that the first read obtains a value while the second read obtains older value (this prevents *read inversion*).

As Byzantine failures are more severe than crash failures, the algorithm of Figure 1 needs to use a mechanism analogous to the “reads have to write” to prevent read inversions from occurring. As previously indicated, This is done by the messages $CATCH_UP()$ broadcast at line 9 and the associated acknowledgments messages $CATCH_UP_DONE()$ received at line 10. As previously indicated, these messages realize a synchronization during which $(n - t)$ processes (i.e., at least $(n - 2t)$ correct processes) have resynchronized their value, if needed (line 15).

A comparison of two instances of the ABD algorithm [3] and the algorithm of Figure 1 is presented in Table 1. The first instance is the version of the ABD algorithm which builds an array of n SWMR (single-writer/multi-reader) atomic registers (one register per process). The second instance is the version of the ABD algorithm which builds a single MWMR (multi-writer/multi-reader) atomic register.

As they depend on the application and not on the algorithm, the size of the values which are written is considered as constant. The parameters n and t have the same meaning as before; m denotes an upper bound on the number of read and write operations on each register. The value $\log n$ is due to the fact that a message carries a constant number of process identities. Similarly, $\log m$

is due to the fact that (a) a message carries a constant number of sequence numbers, and (b) there is a constant number of message tags (including the underlying reliable broadcast).

algorithm	failure type	requirement	msgs/write	msgs/read	msg size	local mem./proc.
ABD: n SWMR	crash	$t < n/2$	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	$O(\log n + \log m)$	$O(n \log m)$
ABD: 1 MWMR	crash	$t < n/2$	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	$O(\log n + \log m)$	$O(n \log m)$
Fig. 1: n SWMR	Byzantine	$t < n/3$	$O(n^2)$	$O(n)$	$O(\log n + \log m)$	$O(n \log m)$

Table 1: Crash vs Byzantine failures: cost comparisons

5 Proof of the construction

The model assumption $n > 3t$ is implicit in all the statements and proofs that follow.

5.1 Preliminary lemmas

Lemma 1 *If a correct process p_i r-delivers a message $\text{WRITE}(w, sn)$ (from a correct or faulty process), any correct process r-delivers it.*

Proof This is an immediate consequence of the RB-Uniformity property of the the r-broadcast abstraction. $\square_{\text{Lemma 1}}$

Lemma 2 *Any two sets (quorums) of $(n - t)$ processes have at least one correct process in their intersection.*

Proof Let Q_1 and Q_2 be two sets of processes such that $|Q_1| = |Q_2| = n - t$. In the worst case, the t processes that are not in Q_1 belong to Q_2 , and the t processes that are not in Q_2 belong to Q_1 . It follows that $|Q_1 \cap Q_2| \geq n - 2t$. As $n > 3t$, it follows that $|Q_1 \cap Q_2| \geq n - 2t \geq t + 1$, which concludes the proof of the lemma. $\square_{\text{Lemma 2}}$

5.2 Proof of the termination properties

Lemma 3 *Let p_i be a correct process. Any invocation of $\text{REG}[i].\text{write}()$ terminates.*

Proof Let us consider the first invocation of $\text{REG}[i].\text{write}()$ by a correct process p_i . This write operation generates the r-broadcast of message $\text{WRITE}(-, 1)$ (lines 1-2). Due to Lemma 1, all correct processes r-deliver this message, and the waiting predicate of line 13 is eventually satisfied. Consequently, each correct process p_k eventually sets $\text{reg}_k[i].sn$ to 1, and sends back to p_i an acknowledgment message $\text{WRITE_DONE}(1)$. As there are least $(n - t)$ correct processes, p_i receives such acknowledgments from at least $(n - t)$ different processes, and terminates its first invocation (lines 3-4).

As, for any given any process p_j , all correct processes process the messages $\text{WRITE}()$ from p_j in their sequence order, the lemma follows from a simple induction (whose previous paragraph is the proof of the base case). $\square_{\text{Lemma 3}}$

Lemma 4 *Let p_i be a correct process. For any j , any invocation of $\text{REG}[j].\text{read}()$ terminates.*

Proof When a correct process p_i invokes $\text{REG}[j].\text{read}()$, it broadcasts a message $\text{READ}(j, rsn)$ where rsn is a new sequence number (lines 5-6). Then, it waits until the freshness predicate of line 7 becomes satisfied. As p_i is correct, each correct process p_k receives $\text{READ}(j, rsn)$, and sends back to p_i a message $\text{STATE}(rsn, wsn)$, where wsn is the sequence number of the last value of $\text{REG}[j]$ it knows (line 15). It follows that p_i receives a message $\text{STATE}(j, -)$ from at least $(n - t)$ correct processes. Let $\text{STATE}(j, wsn_1), \dots, \text{STATE}(j, wsn_{n-t})$ be these messages.

To show that the wait of line 7 terminates we have to show that the freshness predicate $\text{reg}_i[j].sn \geq \max(wsn_1, \dots, wsn_{n-t})$ is eventually satisfied. Let wsn be one of the previous sequence number, and p_k the correct process that send it. This means that $\text{reg}_k[j].sn = wsn$ (line 15), from which we conclude (as p_k is correct) that p_k has previously r-delivered a message $\text{WRITE}(-, wsn)$ and updated accordingly $\text{reg}_k[j]$ at line 13 (let us remember that this is the only line at which the local register $\text{reg}_k[j]$ is updated). It follows from Lemma 1 that eventually p_i r-delivers the message $\text{WRITE}(-, sn)$. It follows then from line 13 that eventually we

have $reg_i[j].sn \geq sn$. As this is true for any sequence number in $\{wsn_1, \dots, wsn_{n-t}\}$, it follows that the freshness predicate is eventually satisfied, and consequently the wait statement of line 7 is satisfied.

Let us now consider the wait statement of line 10, which appears after p_i has broadcast the message $CATCH_UP(j, wsn)$, where $wsn = reg_i[j].sn$ (sequence number in $reg_i[j]$ just after p_i stopped waiting at line 7). We show that any correct process sends back to p_i an acknowledgment $CATCH_UP_DONE(j, wsn)$ at line 17. Process p_i updated $reg_i[j].sn$ to wsn at line 13, and this occurred when it r-delivered a message $WRITE(-, wsn)$. The reasoning is the same as in the previous paragraph, namely, it follows from Lemma 1 that all correct processes r-deliver this message and consequently we have $reg_k[j].sn \geq wsn$ at every correct process p_k . Hence, the value resynchronization predicate of line 16 is eventually satisfied at all correct processes, that consequently sends back a message $CATCH_UP_DONE(j, wsn)$ at line 17, which concludes the proof of the lemma. $\square_{\text{Lemma 4}}$

5.3 Proofs of the consistency (atomicity) properties

The next lemma shows that a sequence H_i , as defined in Section 3, can be associated with each register $REG[i]$.

Lemma 5 *Given any register $REG[i]$, there is a sequence of values H_i such that, if p_i is correct, H_i is the sequence of values written by p_i .*

Proof Let us define H_i as follows. Let us consider all the messages $WRITE(-, sn)$ r-delivered from a (correct or faulty) process p_i by the correct processes (due to Lemma 1, these messages are r-delivered to all correct processes). Let us order these messages according to their processing order as defined by the predicate of line 12. H_i is the corresponding sequence of values. (Let us notice that, if p_i is Byzantine, it is possible that some of its messages $WRITE()$ are r-delivered but never processed at line 14; if any, such messages are never added to H_i).

Let us now consider the case where p_i is correct. It follows from the RB-Validity property of the r-broadcast abstraction that any message r-delivered from p_i , was r-broadcast by p_i . It then follows from lines 1-2 that H_i is the sequence of values written by p_i . $\square_{\text{Lemma 5}}$

Lemma 6 *Let p_i be a correct process. If $read[i, j, x]$ terminates before $write[j, y]$ starts, we have $x < y$.*

Proof Let p_i a correct process that returns value v from the invocation of $REG[j].read()$. Let $reg_i[j] = \langle v, x \rangle$ the pair obtained by p_i at line 8, i.e., $v = H_j[x]$ and $reg_i[j].sn \geq x$ when $read[i, j, x]$ terminates.

As $write[j, y]$ defines $H_j[y]$, it follows that a message $WRITE(-, y)$ is r-delivered from p_j at each correct process p_k which executes $reg_k[j] \leftarrow \langle -, y \rangle$ at line 13. As this occurs after $read[i, j, x]$ has terminated, we necessarily have $x < y$. $\square_{\text{Lemma 6}}$

Lemma 7 *Let p_i and p_j be correct processes. If $write[i, x]$ terminates before $read[j, i, y]$ starts, we have $x \leq y$.*

Proof Let p_i a correct process that returns from its x^{th} invocation of $REG[i].write()$. It follows from line 1 that the sequence number x is associated with the written value. It follows from the r-broadcast of the message $WRITE(v, x)$ issued by p_i (line 2), and its r-delivery (line 12) at each correct process (RB-uniformity of the r-broadcast), that p_i receives $(n-t)$ messages $WRITE_DONE(x)$ (line 3). Let Q_1 be this set of $(n-t)$ processes that sent these messages (line 14). Let us notice that there are at least $(n-2t)$ correct processes in Q_1 and, due to line 13, any of them, say p_k , is such that $reg_k[i].sn \geq x$.

Let p_j be a correct process that invokes $REG[i].read()$. The freshness predicate of line 7 blocks p_j until $reg_j[i].sn \geq \max(wsn_1, \dots, wsn_{n-t})$. Let Q_2 be the set of the $(n-t)$ processes that sent the messages $STATE()$ (line 15) which allowed p_j to exit the wait statement of line 7.

It follows from Lemma 2 that at least one correct process p_k belongs to $Q_1 \cap Q_2$. Hence, when p_i returns from $REG[i].write()$ it received the message $WRITE_DONE(x)$ from p_k , and we have then $reg_k[i].sn \geq x$. As $REG[i].read()$ by p_j started after $REG[i].write()$ by p_i terminated, when p_k sends to p_j the message $STATE(-, reg_k[i].sn)$, we have $reg_k[i].sn \geq x$. It follows that, when p_j exits the wait statement of line 8 we have $reg_j[i].sn \geq x$, which concludes the proof of the lemma. $\square_{\text{Lemma 7}}$

Lemma 8 *Let p_i and p_j be two correct processes. If $read[i, k, x]$ terminates before $read[j, k, y]$ starts, we have $x \leq y$.*

Proof Let us consider process p_i . When it terminates $read[i, k, x]$, it follows from the messages $CATCH_UP()$ and $CATCH_UP_DONE()$ (lines 9-10 and lines 16-17) that p_i received the acknowledgment message $CATCH_UP_DONE(k, x)$ from $(n-t)$ different processes. Let Q_1 be this set of $(n-t)$ processes. Let us notice that there are at least $(n-2t)$ correct processes in Q_1 , and for each of them, say p_ℓ , we have $reg_\ell[k].sn \geq x$.

When p_j invokes $REG[k].read()$ it broadcasts the message $READ()$ and waits until the freshness predicate is satisfied (lines 7). The messages $STATE(-, -)$ it receives are from $(n - t)$ different processes. Let Q_2 be this set of $(n - t)$ processes.

It follows from Lemma 2 that at least one correct process p_ℓ belongs to $Q_1 \cap Q_2$. According to the fact that $read[i, k, x]$ terminates before $read[j, k, y]$ starts, it follows that p_ℓ sent $CATCH_UP_DONE(k, x)$ to p_i before sending the message $STATE(-, s)$ to p_j . As $reg_\ell[k].sn$ never decreases, it follows that $x \leq s$. It finally follows that, when the freshness predicate is satisfied at p_j , we have $reg_j[k].sn \geq s$. As $y = reg_j[k].sn$ (lines 8-11), it follows that $x \leq y$, which concludes the proof. $\square_{Lemma\ 8}$

5.4 Piecing together the lemmas

Theorem 2 *The algorithm described in Figure 1 implements an array of n SWMR atomic (linearizable) registers (one register per process) in the system model $BAMP_{n,t}[t < n/3]$.*

Proof The proof follows from Lemmas 3-8 and Theorem 1. $\square_{Theorem\ 2}$

6 Conclusion

This paper presented a signature-free algorithm building an array of n single-writer/multi-reader atomic registers (with a register per process) in an n -process asynchronous message-passing system where up to $t < n/3$ processes may commit Byzantine failures.

This algorithm relies on an underlying reliable broadcast [6], an appropriate freshness predicate and a value resynchronization mechanism which ensure that a correct process always reads up-to-date values. A noteworthy property of this algorithm lies in its conceptual simplicity.

According to the result of [12] this algorithm is optimal from a t -resilience point of view. While the cost of a read operation is linear with respect to n , a problem which remains open lies in its $O(n^2)$ message complexity for write operations. This cost is due to the use of a Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast. Hence the question: Is it possible to reduce it, or is $O(n^2)$ a lower bound when one has to implement an atomic register in a signature-free message-passing distributed system prone to Byzantine failures? We conjecture it is a lower bound.

Acknowledgments

This work has been partially supported by the French ANR project DISPLEXITY devoted to computability and complexity in distributed computing, the Franco-German ANR-DFG project DISCMAT (devoted to connections between mathematics and distributed computing), and the French ANR project CO₂Dim.

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A A Reliable Broadcast Algorithm

The r-broadcast algorithm presented in Figure 2 is Bracha's algorithm [6] enriched with sequence numbers. Each process p_i manages a local array $next_i[1..n]$, where $next_i[j]$ is the sequence number sn of the next application message (namely, $APP(-, sn)$) from p_j , that p_i will process (line 3). Initially, for all i, j , $next_i[j] = 1$.

When a process p_i invokes R_broadcast $APP(v, sn)$, it broadcasts the message $APP(v, sn)$ (line 1) where sn is its next sequence number. On its "server" role, the behavior of a process p_i is as follows.

- When a process p_i receives a message $APP(v, sn)$ from a process p_j for the first time, it first waits until it can process this message (line 3). Process p_i then broadcasts a message $ECHO(j, v, sn)$ (line 4). If the message just received is not the first message $APP(-, sn)$, p_j is Byzantine and the message is discarded.
- Then, when p_i has received the same message $ECHO(j, v, sn)$ from "enough" processes (where "enough" means "more than $(n + t)/2$ different processes"), and has not yet broadcast a message $READY(j, v, sn)$, it does it (lines 6-9).

The aim of (a) the messages $ECHO(j, v, sn)$, and (b) the cardinality "greater than $(n + t)/2$ processes", is to ensure that no two correct processes can r-deliver distinct messages from p_j (in the case where p_j is Byzantine). The aim of the messages $READY(j, v, sn)$ is related to the liveness of the algorithm. Namely, its aim is to allow (at least when p_j is correct) the r-delivery by the correct processes of the very same message $APP(v, sn)$ from p_j , and this must always occur if p_j is correct. It is nevertheless possible that a message r-broadcast by a Byzantine process p_j be never r-delivered by the correct processes.

```

operation R_broadcast APP( $v, sn$ ):
(1)  broadcast APP( $v, sn$ ).

when a message APP( $v, sn$ ) from  $p_j$  is received:
(2)  if no message APP( $-, sn$ ) received from  $p_j$ 
(3)    then wait ( $next_i[j] = sn$ );
(4)    broadcast ECHO( $j, v, sn$ )
(5)  end if.

when a message ECHO( $j, v, sn$ ) is received:
(6)  if ECHO( $j, v, sn$ ) received from strictly more than  $\frac{n+t}{2}$  different processes
(7)     $\wedge$  READY( $j, v, sn$ ) never sent
(8)    then broadcast READY( $j, v, sn$ )
(9)  end if.

when a message READY( $j, v, sn$ ) is received:
(10) if READY( $j, v, sn$ ) received from at least  $t + 1$  different processes
(11)   $\wedge$  READY( $j, v, sn$ ) never sent
(12)  then broadcast READY( $j, v, sn$ )
(13) end if;
(14) if READY( $j, v, sn$ ) received from at least  $2t + 1$  different processes
(15)   $\wedge$  APP( $v, sn$ ) by  $p_j$  never R_delivered
(16)  then R_deliver APP( $v, sn$ ) from  $p_j$ ;
(17)     $next_i[j] \leftarrow next_i[j] + 1$ 
(18) end if.

```

Figure 2: Reliable Broadcast in $\mathcal{BAMP}_{n,t}[t < n/3]$, (code for process p_i)

- Finally, when p_i has received the message READY(j, v, sn) from $(t + 1)$ different processes, it broadcasts the same message READY(j, v, sn), if not yet done. This is required to ensure the RB-termination property. If p_i has received “enough” messages READY(j, v, sn) (as before “enough” means “from more than $(n + t)/2$ different processes”), it r-delivers the message APP(v, sn) r-broadcast by p_j .

Proofs that this algorithm satisfies the properties defining the reliable broadcast abstraction can be found in [6, 20].